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Public Policy Issues Raised by Bank
Securities Activities *
SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
For the past fifty years commercial banking and investment
banking activities were separated pursuant to the Glass-Steagall
Act. The Securities Industry Association presents its perspective
on various legislative proposals currently being considered to
redefine the role of commercial banks in the securities field.
OVERVIEW
The commercial banking industry and the securities industry
each play a crucial role in our financial system, the stability and
efficient functioning of which are vital to our national well-being.
For the past half-century, it has been declared national policy to
foster and preserve the soundness of our financial system by sep-
arating commercial banking and investment banking. Subject to
limited exceptions, banks have been legislatively prohibited from
engaging in the securities business, while securities firms have
been prohibited from entering the banking business.
Despite the long-established congressional policy of separating
commercial banking from investment banking, recent years have
witnessed increasing instances of efforts by major commercial
banks to engage in securities activities. Moreover, now pending
* [Editor's Note] The San Diego Law Review is again pleased to provide a
forum for the publication of the Securities Industry Association's (SIA) White
Paper on bank securities activities. The Review was unsuccessful in its attempts
to elicit a response to this article from the banking industry. Because of the
Review's desire to present a diversity of quality opinion, such a response would
still be welcome. Interested and responsible parties should address their
manuscripts to the San Diego Law Review Association, University of San Diego
School of Law, San Diego, California 92110.
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before the Congress are a number of legislative proposals which,
if adopted, would represent a significant departure from the long-
standing policy of sharply limiting the permissible securities ac-
tivities of commercial banks. This article is intended to present
the perspective of the securities industry on these proposals in a
way that will promote intelligent and informed consideration by
those responsible for resolving this issue.1
Any scheme of restrictive regulation deserves revisiting periodi-
cally in light of current conditions. Moreover, this is unquestiona-
bly a period of significant change in the financial services
industry. Recent combinations of non-bank financial institutions,
the emergence of money market mutual funds, and the an-
nounced intention of the holding company of the Nation's largest
commercial bank to acquire the largest discount brokerage firm2
bear witness to the truth of this broadly shared perception. It is,
therefore, both timely and appropriate for Congress to reexamine
the Glass-Steagall Act as well as the other laws and regulations
that govern the banking and securities industries.
To recognize the important changes that have occurred over the
last fifty years, however, is not necessarily to conclude that the
policy of separating commercial banking from investment banking
is no longer valid. In fact, the Securities Industry Association
(SIA) firmly believes that a full examination of these develop-
ments and of the legal regimes governing the banking and securi-
ties industries will result in reaffirmation of that policy. The SIA,
therefore, welcomes such a thoroughgoing congressional review.
First Principles
An informed assessment of legislative changes that would per-
mit banks to enlarge their securities activities requires, at the out-
set, recognition of several fundamental realities.
First, because of their importance as financial intermediaries,
banks have been accorded a variety of privileges designed to re-
duce their costs of intermediation and hence enable them to
make credit available at a lower cost than is available from other
financial institutions. Included among such privileges are
favorable tax treatment and the ability to obtain funds readily at
low cost from depositors, from other banks in the federal funds
1. This article, written in the spring of 1982, updates a more detailed discus-
sion paper setting forth the legal and policy underpinnings of the SIA's position,
entitled Bank Securities Activities: Memorandum for Study and Discussion, re-
printed in 14 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 751 (1977) (hereinafter referred to as SIA Discus-
sion Paper).
2. See infra text accompanying note 27.
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market, and from the Federal Reserve's discount window. Each
of these privileges is paid for by taxpayers and bank depositors
and is provided to banks for the intended benefit of those in need
of credit; not for the purpose of enhancing the ability of banks to
engage in non-banking activities. Yet, because of these and other
advantages, banks possess an enormous edge when they compete
with other types of enterprises in non-banking businesses. As
long as banks are permitted to keep these advantages, talk of a
"level playing field" on which banks and non-banks are to com-
pete head-to-head is at best disingenuous.
A second important factor to be weighed in judging the proper
scope of bank activities is the enormous economic power of the
major commercial banks. Commercial banks control in the aggre-
gate $1.8 trillion in assets and provide a very substantial portion
of all external corporate financing through bank loans.3 Accord-
ingly, the implications, both for our economy and our political
system, of measures that would increase the role of banks in our
financial markets must be carefully weighed.
A third key factor is preservation ofthe stability of the banking
system. To the extent that entry by banks into non-banking areas
gives rise to conflicts of interest threatening the soundness of in-
dividual lending decisions or undermines depositor or public con-
fidence in the banking system, the stability of the system is
jeopardized. Similarly, if bank earnings become subject to vola-
tile fluctuations resulting from undue dependence upon revenues
from brokerage and underwriting, which are inherently cyclical,
stability is undermined.
It should also be borne in mind from the outset that despite the
commendable general movement towards deregulation of United
States business, financial institutions are always likely to be sub-
ject to governmental oversight and regulation to a substantial ex-
tent. In light of their role as custodians of the funds of others and
their pivotal importance to the functioning of the economy, it
would be unrealistic to expect and unwise to promote total dereg-
ulation. This is not to say that there are not many aspects of the
regulation of financial institutions that require elimination or re-
form, for clearly there are. The point is that today's presumption
against regulatory restraints should not prevent consideration of
the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions as part of a larger regulatory
3. FDIC, 1980 BANE OPERATING STATISTICS (1981).
scheme. Indeed, that scheme surely will require further adjust-
ments if Glass-Steagall is modified materially, to be certain that
there will be no regulatory inequality.
These and other considerations are important to reasoned con-
gressional deliberation on the legislative proposals now pending
and others that may be proposed in the future that would alter
existing restraints on permissible bank securities activities. The
outcome of congressional consideration bf these measures can
have profound and irreversible effects throughout our financial
system. Indeed, a material relaxation of the restrictions on bank
securities activities could well result in a fundamental restructur-
ing of the system into one in which commercial banks effectively
control access to the credit markets. In light of the generally ac-
knowledged inflexibility of many European national credit mar-
kets, where such a condition now generally exists, the potential
long-term consequences of congressional action on this subject
must not be minimized. On the immediate horizon, congressional
action on this subject could have direct and substantial impact on
the economic revitalization program Congress put in place in
1981-a program whose success will depend in great part upon the
ability of the capital markets to efficiently supply vast quantities
of investment capital.
Legislative Alternatives
Although the SIA believes that the separation of commercial
banking and investment banking mandated by the Glass-Steagall
Act continues to be sound public policy, significant recent devel-
opments in the financial services industry make the comprehen-
sive review now under way in both houses of Congress entirely
appropriate. The SIA expects that this review, which is a neces-
sary precondition to informed action on any legislation that would
materially alter the lines of Glass-Steagall, will result in reaffirma-
tion of the existing law and recognition of the continued wisdom
of its policy underpinnings. Nevertheless, if Congress should con-
clude that changes are in order, there are three alternative ap-
proaches that legislation could take.
One alternative, in theory, would be outright repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act, thereby removing the principal legislative re-
strictions inhibiting banks from full engagement in the securities
business and securities firms from involvement in commercial
banking. Because such an approach would represent high-risk
radical surgery and would fail to address the concerns that occa-
sioned enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act, it would seem to be
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an unwise approach not likely to enjoy widespread support in
Congress.
A second approach, embraced by a number of pending bills,4
would be to authorize banks to directly engage in one or more ac-
tivities now proscribed by Glass-Steagall. Although this approach
would avoid some of the apparent shortcomings of the first alter-
native, if only because it is more limited, it too would present sev-
eral significant drawbacks unless accompanied by provisions
stripping banks of the special advantages accorded them because
of their role as financial intermediaries and placing them on the
same regulatory footing with securities firms when engaging in
the newly authorized activities. Without such accompanying pro-
visions, banks would be permitted to make use of special tax and
other cost advantages accorded at the expense of taxpayers and
depositors in support of activities that do not require public sub-
sidy and would enjoy an unwarranted and unfair advantage over
competing securities firms.
A third option would be to authorize bank participation in the
securities business through a separate bank holding company
subsidiary that would be subject to the same regulatory and tax
treatment as applies to other firms engaged in comparable activi-
ties, with safeguards to prevent the relationship between the
bank and the affiliate from giving rise to conflicts of interest, un-
fair competitive advantages, and threats to bank stability. Should
Congress, after completion of its review, conclude that relaxation
of the Glass-Steagall restrictions is in the public interest, the SIA
believes that this overall approach is conceptually most sound.
While this is the general approach proposed initially in 1981 by
the Reagan administration, the SIA has a number of reservations
about the specifics of that proposal, centering on the workability
and adequacy of safeguards against the problems dealt with else-
where in this article.5
In the sections which follow, we briefly review the history of
congressional policy regarding permissible activities of commer-
cial banks, identify the principal securities activities in which
banks have engaged or attempted to engage, analyze bank conten-
4. See infra note 30.
5. See Securities Activities of Depository Institutions: Hearings on S. 1720
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 438 (1982) (statement of Edgar Jannotta, SIA
Chairman).
tions that other financial institutions have invaded their domain,
and discuss the policy considerations which must be addressed in
examining proposed relaxations of the Glass-Steagall Act. The
final section seeks to impart the necessary perspective to the cur-
rent debate concerning amendment of the Glass-Steagall Act by
explaining the relationship of the Act to the larger body of legisla-
tion and regulation which governs the banking and securities
industries.
HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL POLICY DEFINING PERMISSIBLE
AcTIVTs OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
Since enacting the National Bank Act in 1864,6 Congress repeat-
edly has expressed its determination that the public policy of the
United States must be to separate the business of commercial
banking from unrelated areas of economic or commercial activity.
In fact, the history of federal bank regulation largely has been an
effort to restrain the domination of commercial banks over non-
banking sectors of the economy. Although Congress has willingly
accorded banks a number of special privileges that support and
reinforce their position as principal suppliers of credit to the pri-
vate sector, recognition of their central role and concerns about
excessive concentrations of power, security of depositors' funds,
conflicts of interest, and unfair competition have produced a gen-
eraly cautious congressional attitude toward bank expansions
into unrelated areas of business.
In 1933, Congress recognized the dangerous involvement of
commercial banks in non-banking fields, particularly in the secur-
ities industry, and decisively moved to terminate such activity. In
enacting the Banking Act of 1933,7 the securities provisions of
which are commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress
prohibited banks from entering the securities field as well as
other non-banking areas. It enumerated the direct powers of na-
tional banks in Section 16 of that Act8 and described certain lim-
ited incidental powers that would be permitted in order for the
business of banking to be conducted efficiently.9 The Act further
6. National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 38 (1976)).
7. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12, 15, and 39 U.S.C.).
8. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 743.
9. Among those incidental powers is a very narrowly circumscribed ability to
purchase and sell securities limited only to: "purchasing and selling such securi-
ties and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, cus-
tomers, and in no case for its own account, and the [bank] shall not underwrite
any issue of securities or stock." 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. IV 1980).
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prohibited an entity that issues, underwrites, sells or distributes
securities from engaging in the banking business and forbade
member banks of the Federal Reserve System from being affili-
ated with securities firms, either directly or through interlocking
directorships.10
The Glass-Steagall Act was a product of congressional indigna-
tion over the role of national banks in fostering the pre-panic
speculation leading to the national financial crises of the 1920's
and 1930's:
The outstanding development in the commercial banking system during
the pre-panic period was the appearance of excessive security loans, and
of overinvestment in securities of all kinds. The effects of this situation in
changing the whole character of the banking problem can hardly be over-
emphasized. National banks were never intended to undertake invest-
ment banking business on a large scale, and the whole tenor of legislation
and administrative rulings concerning them has been away from recogni-
tion of such a growth in the direction of investment banking as
legitimate .... 11
As viewed by the Supreme Court, the Glass-Steagall Act re-
flected a "determination that policies of competition, convenience,
or expertise which might otherwise support the entry of commer-
cial banks into the investment banking business were outweighed
by the 'hazards' and 'financial dangers'" that arise when commer-
cial banks engage in such activities proscribed by the Act as gen-
eral securities trading.12 We believe these "hazards" and
10. 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 378(a)(1) (1976).
11. S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1933). This purpose is also reflected
by the comments on the Senate floor of Senator Glass, the Senate sponsor of the
Act:
Not only has the Federal reserve banking system been used in an inor-
dinate measure in stock-market transactions but there appears to have
been an extraordinary misconception by the administrators of the [Glass-
Steagall] act of its real purpose. In large degree the system has been
transformed into an investment banking system, whereas the fixed pur-
pose of Congress was to set up a commercial banking system and to pre-
clude speculative operations ....
75 CONG. REC. 9884 (1932) (statement of Sen. Glass). Furthermore, Representative
Steagall, co-sponsor of the bill, stated in debate:
[T]he purpose of this legislation is to protect the people of the United
States in the right to have banks in which their deposits will be safe.
They have a right to expect of Congress the establishment and mainte-
nance of a system of banks in the United States where citizens may place
their hard earnings with reasonable expectation of being able to get them
out again upon demand.
77 CONG. REc. 3837 (1933) (statement of Rep. Steagall).
12. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971). For a review of the
legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act as well as the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 and the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, discussed
"financial dangers" are as real today as ever, since no evidence
yet tendered suggests that investment bankers have discovered a
way to eliminate financial risks from the underwriting business,
or a method of distributing securities without promotional
activity.' 3
Although the Glass-Steagall Act is the principal legislative con-
straint to bank involvement in the securities industry, the larger
theme which it sounded-the necessity of separating banking
from other areas of commerce-has predominated subsequent
bank reform legislation. The Bank Holding Company Act of
195614 was intended, among other things, to separate banking
from other areas of commerce. Such separation was felt neces-
sary to prevent banks from utilizing in non-banking enterprises
funds entrusted by depositors and to guard against banks taking
unfair advantage in competing with non-banking enterprises.'5
These same concerns, as well as fear of undue concentration of
power in bank holding companies, led to enactment of the Bank
Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970.16 The principal pur-
pose of the 1970 amendments was to close the 1956 Act's one-bank
holding company loophole to preserve the basic separation of
bank and bank-related activities from other business activities.'7
As indicated in the following colloquy occurring during Senate
floor actions on the amendments, the Congress was careful to
avoid any narrowing of the restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act:
MR. WILLIAMS of New Jersey... I wonder whether there was any in-
tention to imply that the very securities-related activities forbidden to
banks directly may nevertheless be engaged in by bank-holding compa-
nies or their non-banking affiliates.
MR. SPARKMAN. The answer to the Senator's question is that there
clearly was not.18
Thus, on the three occasions over the past half-century when
the Congress has directed concerted attention to the issue--1933,
infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text, see SIA Discussion Paper, supra note 1,
at Appendix I.
13. The best demonstration of the risks that remain inherent in underwriting
was provided by the offering in 1979 of $1 billion of IBM debentures. An unex-
pected increase in interest rates immediately after the issue was priced left the
underwriting synidcate with large losses that were never publicly disclosed but
which have been estimated to range from $10 million to $20 million.
14. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1844, 1846-1848 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
15. See SIA Discussion Paper, supra note 1, at 803, 804.
16. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-607, 84
Stat. 1760 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1843, 1849, 1850, 1971-1978; 31
U.S.C. §§ 317(c), 324, 324(b), 324(c), 391, 405(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
17. S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 5519, 5520-22.
18. 116 CONG. REC. 42,430 (1970) (statements of Sens. Williams and
Sparkman).
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1956 and 1970-it has in each instance concluded that the range of
non-banking activities in which commercial banks and their affili-
ates should be permitted to engage must be carefully circum-
scribed in the interest of sound public policy. Nonetheless, in
recent years commercial banks have expanded their operations
into numerous non-banking fields. Among the businesses in
which they have engaged, or attempted to engage, are operating
an insurance agency, providing financial and management con-
sulting services, operating travel agencies, and providing data
processing services.19 And, as is described in the next section,
their role in various aspects of the securities business undoubt-
edly has developed beyond anything dreamed of when the Glass-
Steagall Act was adopted.
SECURIIES AcTivrrms OF BANKS
At the time of enactment, the regime established by the Glass-
Steagall Act seemed unequivocal and unambiguous-a sharp sep-
aration of the commercial banking and securities industries with
limited and very tightly defined exceptions.
By way of example, the Act clearly contemplated that banks
could continue to execute so-called "accommodation transac-
tions" on behalf of their existing customers. 20 This exemption ini-
tially was viewed to be quite narrow-to cover situations where
no brokerage house was located in a particular community.21 The
Act also contained an exemption permitting banks to continue to
19. According to Senator Proxmire's statement introducing the Competition in
Banking Act of 1975:
[I]t appears that banks have engaged, or attempted to engage, in the fol-
lowing nonbanking activities: (1) operating an insurance agency (2) un-
derwriting securities other than those exempt under section 24 of Title 12;
(3) privately placing non-exempt securities; (4) providing financial coun-
seling services; (5) providing investment advisory services to closed-end
investment companies; (6) operating mutual funds; (7) providing securi-
ties brokerage services; (8) operating travel agencies; (9) providing ar-
mored car services; (10) providing data processing services; and
(11) leasing automobiles.
121 CONG. REC. 37, 943-47 (1975).
20. See supra note 9.
21. Despite early rulings of the Comptroller of the Currency interpreting this
exemption restrictively, subsequent revisions by the Comptroller have considera-
bly expanded the original notion. See, e.g., Ruling of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, Jan. 8, 1980, reprinted in [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. BANING L REP.
(CCH) 85,210 (national banks authorized to act as agents for customers in open-
end investment companies shares transactions).
underwrite and distribute United States Government obligations
and general obligations of state and municipal governments. 22
These were the only express exceptions to the otherwise prevail-
ing prohibition against bank involvement in the securities
business.
Despite the apparent expectations of Congress in adopting the
Glass-Steagall Act, the years since its enactment have witnessed
extensive and increasing involvement by commercial banks in the
securities business. Although certain of these activities are ad-
mittedly peripheral to the underwriting and marketing functions
with which the Congress was most concerned,23 others clearly are
close to the core of investment banking activity.24
The following subsections briefly describe the principal activi-
ties of commercial banks in the securities area. Although there is
substantial question concerning the legality of certain of these
functions, 25 it should be apparent from the range of described ac-
tivities that banks hardly are straitjacketed by existing law, as ap-
plied by the bank regulatory agencies.
Investment Advisory Services
Apart from their own assets, banks are responsible for the man-
agement of more funds than any other type of financial institu-
tion. In their capacity as fiduciaries, banks manage the assets of
pension and other employee benefit plans and of trusts and es-
tates of individuals. In their capacity as agents, they manage the
portfolios of a variety of individual and corporate customers. In
addition, banks serve as investment advisers to both open-end
and closed-end investment companies and also act as investment
advisers to real estate investment trusts ("REITs"), which, in
many cases, they initially sponsored.
Brokerage Related Services
Banks offer their customers several brokerage-related services,
such as dividend reinvestment plans under which shareholders of
a participating corporation may request that their dividends be
paid directly to a bank, which pools the dividends received and
purchases additional shares of the corporation's stock in the open
market. Besides pooling funds, some banks perform a more tradi-
22. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
23. Included among these activities are bank trust advisory services and syn-
dication of long term loans.
24. Such activities include bank marketing of commercial paper and acquisi-
tion of brokerage firms with independent customer pools.
25. See SIA Discussion Paper, supra note 1, at 760-65.
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tional type of brokerage by executing agency transactions for
their trust and other managed accounts, as well as for banking
customers, through a registered broker-dealer. 26
Developments in late 1981 signaled a potential giant step in
bank involvement in the brokerage business. In November 1981,
BankAmerica Corporation, the holding company of the nation's
largest commercial bank, announced its intention to acquire
Charles Schwab & Company, Inc., the nation's largest discount
brokerage firm. Shortly thereafter, Security Pacific National
Bank, the ninth largest commercial bank, announced an arrange-
ment under which brokerage services would be actively marketed
by Security Pacific, with execution of orders to be performed by
Fidelity Brokerage Services, Inc. 27
Investment Banking Services
Under the Glass-Steagall Act, commercial banks may under-
write and distribute to the public certain specified debt instru-
ments, including obligations of the United States, general
obligations of states and their political subdivisions for housing,
university or dormitory purposes, and a limited number of other
government securities. 28 In recent years, however, the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency has permitted commercial banks to under-
write and distribute instruments which do not fit squarely into
any of the Act's circumscribed categories.29 Legislation now
pending, if enacted, would remove entirely the Glass-Steagall
Act's limitations on commercial bank underwriting, and would
permit commercial banks to underwrite and deal in all federal,
26. In a related context, two federally chartered savings and loan associations
(as to which application of the Glass-Steagall Act is uncertain) recently applied
for regulatory permission to organize, through a service corporation, a registered
broker-dealer that could effect securities transactions for customers of similar
thrift institutions around the nation. See SEC. WEEK, Jan. 25, 1982, at 11.
27. At the time of this writing, no regulatory determination on either of these
proposals-which raise substantial legal as well as policy issues-had been made.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). These banks reportedly purchase
more of their syndicate participation for their own accounts than they distribute.
E. HERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST' COMMERCIAL BANK TRUST DEPARTMENTS 12
(1975).
29. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.3-1.5 (1982); see also Ruling of the Comptroller of the
Currency, reprinted in [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING I REP. (CCH)
82,201 (obligations of private non-profit corporation formed at the request of the
state issued to purchase student loans from originating banks are obligations is-
sued by a state for university purposes).
state and local government revenue and general obligation bonds
of investment grade, except industrial revenue bonds.30
Apart from underwriting, the investment banking activities of
commercial banks generally take two forms, the rendering of
financial advice to corporations and the funding or furnishing (or
both) of funds for the long-term capital needs of corporations.
Financial counseling may be provided for a fee either on a long-
term basis or for specific projects (e.g., the financing of a new
plant) and generally comprehends the customer's total need for
financing, ranging from short-term borrowings to permanent capi-
tal.31 Where funds are to be obtained other than through the
bank itself, the bank frequently will assist its customer in prepar-
ing the necessary documents for a private placement 32 or select-
ing and negotiating with an underwriter in the case of a public
offering. Banks also furnish advice in connection with corporate
reorganizations, including mergers and acquisitions, and some-
times perform appraisal services in connection with such
transactions.
Banks also serve directly as a source of long-term funds, either
through their own lending facilities or by arranging private place-
ment of securities with other lenders. At the time the Glass-Stea-
gall Act was enacted, bank lending typically was short-term in
character, ranging from demand to ninety-day loans. Since then,
banks have gradually increased the maturity of their loans, so
that term loans (those exceeding one year in maturity) now con-
stitute a very substantial proportion of industrial and commercial
loans of major commercial banks.33 Frequently, these loans are
made through syndicates of banks, which contain from a handful
to a substantial number of domestic, and sometimes foreign,
banks. Syndicated bank loans are effected for domestic and for-
eign borrowers and are extended both by United States banks
and their overseas affiliates.3 4
In addition to providing long-term funds themselves, banks
have become quite active in arranging, for a fee, private place-
ments of securities of all types, from long-term bonds to equities,
30. See S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S11,254 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1981); H.R. 4040, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H4048 (daily ed. June 26,
1981); MR. 2828, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H1143 (daily ed. Mar. 25,
1981).
31. In two private interpretive letters dated Nov. 11, 1974 and Jan. 15, 1975, the
Comptroller authorized the provision of financial counseling services by national
banks. See SIA Discussion Paper, supra note 1, at Appendices HA and I03.
32. See id. In those same letters, the Comptroller also authorized limited
bank involvement in private placement activities.
33. See 62 FED. REs. BuLu. A23 (1976).
34. See exhibits in SIA Discussion Paper, supra note 1, at Appendix IIL
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with a variety of institutional lenders. 35 Although some of the
commercial banks most active in the private placement of securi-
ties do not report the extent of those activities, during 1980 those
banks which did report were involved in over $800 million of pri-
vate placements.36 In some instances, banks participate in private
placements they have arranged by purchasing for portfolios under
their management a portion of the securities to be sold. On occa-
sion a bank will assemble for a customer a financing package con-
sisting of a medium-term loan from the bank itself, together with
a private placement to provide the ultimate long-term financing
and "take-out" the bank.37
In 1978, Bankers Trust Company of New York inaugurated a
new business for commercial banks by underwriting and market-
ing third-party commercial paper (i.e., short-term, unsecured cor-
porate obligations). In July 1981, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia invalidated a ruling of the Federal
Reserve Board which had sustained this practice as being consis-
tent with the Glass-Steagall Act.38
Since the Glass-Steagall restrictions do not apply to their for-
eign securities activities, banks based in the United States have
been engaging in an ever-increasing range of investment banking
activities overseas. These banks participate in large syndicated
bank loans to foreign borrowers and Eurobond underwriting sys-
tems through foreign branches, Edge Act corporations, 39 and in-
vestments in foreign banks; in addition, they offer financial
counseling services.40 And, under regulations adopted in 1981 by
35. See private interpretive letters of the Comptroller, supra note 31.
36. INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIGEST, Mar. 3, 1981, at 36.
37. See E. HERMAN, supra note 28, at 47-48.
38. See A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 519 F.
Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-2070 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 1981).
39. Edge Act corporations are corporations organized under 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-
631 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980):
for the purpose of engaging in international or foreign banking or other in-
ternational or foreign financial operations, or in banking or other financial
operations in a dependency or insular possession of the United States,
either directly or through the agency, ownership or control of local institu-
tions in foreign countries, or in such dependencies or insular possessions
as provided by sections 611-631 of this title [which may] act when re-
quired by the Secretary of the Treasury as fiscal agents of the United
States, [and which] may be formed by any number of natural persons, not
less in any case than five ....
Id. § 611.
40. Eurobonds are securities publicly offered by an international underwriting
syndicate in more than one country. Of the 173 Eurobond offerings in 1975, it was
the Federal Reserve Board,41 these banks are now able to engage
in international banking through on-shore "international banking
facilities"--the income from which is exempt from state and local
taxes-unfettered by the reserve requirements and interest rate
limitations otherwise applicable to their domestic operations.
If history is a guide, major commercial banks will continue to
extend their activities in the securities industry under existing
law. Now pending are a number of proposals which collectively
would largely eviscerate the Glass-Steagall prohibitions against
commercial bank involvement in the investment banking busi-
ness. In addition to the proposal to permit bank underwriting and
distribution of municipal revenue bonds, others would permit
them directly to underwrite all types of corporate obligations 42
and to establish, operate and sell interests in money market mu-
tual funds.43
BANK ALLEGATIONS OF ENCROACHMENT BY OTHER
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
In support of their efforts to eliminate Glass-Steagall Act limita-
tions, bankers are increasingly heard to argue that changed cir-
cumstances and developments unforeseen by Congress in
enacting Glass-Steagall have rendered its restrictions both anach-
ronistic and unnecessary. Frequently cited examples are the
emergence of money market mutual funds and special brokerage
accounts featuring automatic investment of idle balances in a
money market fund, combined with access to funds so invested,
or borrowed on margin, by check or credit/debit card ("asset
management accounts"), as well as recent corporate combina-
tions of non-bank financial institutions. 44 Bankers contend that in
light of these developments, Glass-Steagall restrictions are un-
fairly restraining banks while securities firms and other financial
institutions are given free rein to encroach on the banking
business.
While it is easy to cite many materially changed circumstances
reported that Manufacturers Hanover Ltd., an affiliate of Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Company, participated in 159, Citibank's foreign affiliate in 128, Bank of
America's in 99, Bankers Trust's in 48 and First Chicago's in 36. Lessons the Banks
Learned From Overseas Misadventures, Bus. WI-, Apr. 19, 1976, at 104.
41. See 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1982).
42. See, e.g., H.R. 4040, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H4048 (daily ed.
June 26, 1981).
43. See, e.g., S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CoNG. REC. S11,254 (daily ed.
Oct. 7, 1981).
44. See Competition and Conditions in the Financial System: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
240-47 (1981) (statement of Gordon T. Wallis, Pres., N.Y. Clearing House Ass'n).
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since enactment of Glass-Steagall, perhaps the best example of
which is the high inflation that has beset our economy and the
record interest rates it has engendered, to acknowledge this real-
ity is not necessarily to conclude that the restrictions of Glass-
Steagall have lost their validity. In fact, the examples cited by the
bankers, upon examination, have little if any bearing on whether
the Glass-Steagall Act requires amendment.
To assess these contentions, it is well to bear in mind the essen-
tial attribute which distinguishes the business of banking from
the activities of other financial institutions. The extension of
credit alone is not the distinguishing feature since for many years
business loans have been made by non-bank institutional lenders,
such as insurance companies and pension funds, and retail credit
has been available from charge card issuers, as well as from con-
sumer finance companies and individual retail establishments.
Rather, what distinguishes banks is that they extend credit
from the proceeds of deposits received from their customers. The
acceptance of deposits, which gives rise to a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship between banks and their customers and which in turn
provides the assets to support bank lending, has long been the
generally recognized hallmark of the banking business under
state and federal law. With this essential distinction firmly in
mind, one can examine the bankers' specific contentions regard-
ing money-market mutual funds, asset management accounts and
mergers of non-bank financial institutions.
Prior to the advent of money market mutual funds, money mar-
ket instruments such as short-term commercial paper, certificates
of deposit and Treasury bills were generally beyond the invest-
ment reach of small investors because of their large denomina-
tions.45 What the money market funds have done is make it
possible for small investors to hold continuing interests in a di-
versified and changing portfolio of money market instruments,
with the potential of realizing high yield and diversification of risk
not previously possible. For investor convenience, many money
market funds also offer a "check redemption" procedure whereby
a shareholder may write a check payable to a third party against a
checking account maintained by the fund with a commercial
bank.
The shareholder's investment in a money market fund takes the
45. See id. at 1177 (statement of the Investment Company Institute).
form of shares of common stock in the fund upon which dividends
are declared and paid daily. The value of the shareholder's equity
fluctuates directly with the value of the fund's portfolio, which is
comprised of short-term money market instruments. This type of
investment is sharply distinguishable from a bank deposit, in
which the depositor is a creditor entitled to a fixed rate of return
and deposit insurance up to a prescribed ceiling.
If banks have legitimate grounds for concern about money mar-
ket mutual funds, it is not that they encroach upon banking, since
to the extent they have a feature resembling banking-redemp-
tion checking-commercial banks are utilized. Rather, it is that
they are attracting the assets of potential depositors away from
the banks, in large part because of extraordinarily high interest
rates. If the banks require governmental action to redress the sit-
uation, they should be seeking accelerated removal of ceilings on
interest payable by banks or a lowering of interest rates through
economic revitalization, not authority to engage in investment
banking, which will not increase bank deposits but will subject
banks to all of the risks inherent in investment banking.
Many of the same points apply to asset management account
programs. These programs combine traditional broker services
with a money market mutual fund and provide access to the in-
vestors' assets and the margin account via either a check or a
credit/debit card. Again, a commercial bank is utilized in imple-
menting both the checking and credit/debit card features.
In effect, an asset management account is no more than a pack-
aging of several services that have been offered separately for
some time. To the extent it incorporates a service traditionally of-
fered by banks, the service is performed by a bank. As the many
unsuccessful legal efforts to challenge these programs attest, they
do not involve broker encroachment upon the business of banking
as traditionally deflned.4 6 As with money market mutual funds,
they do, however, have obvious attractiveness to investors. To the
extent bankers are apprehensive about the relative unattractive-
ness of bank-offered packages of financial services attributable to
the disparity between earnings realizable through an asset man-
agement account and those from bank deposits, the solution lies
in seeking to eliminate this disparity, not by permitting banks to
engage in the securities business.
Bankers also cite recent corporate combinations of non-bank
financial institutions to support weakening of the Glass-Steagall
46. See, e.g., Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst.,
450 U.S. 46 (1981) (Federal Reserve regulation authorizing bank holding companies
to act as investment advisors upheld).
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Act.4 7 It is difficult to see how such mergers are relevant to the
separation of commercial banking and investment banking estab-
lished by Glass-Steagall. No one claims that such combinations
have injected securities firms into the business of banking. To the
extent the bankers' argument is directed at any potential anti-
competitive effects of these combinations, there has been no indi-
cation that the antitrust laws will not provide adequate protec-
tion. If, on the other hand, bankers feel they are entitled to some
new opportunities to enter other lines of business to "compen-
sate" for these mergers, their argument, for what it may be worth,
should be directed at the Bank Holding Company Act, not Glass-
Steagall.
EXAMINATION OF POLICY IssuEs
This section will explore some of the fundamental policy issues
raised by bank participation in securities activities, starting with a
discussion of national policy objectives for the banking and secur-
ities industries.
Public Policy Objectives
In assessing the advisability of adjustments in the Glass-Stea-
gall Act, it is necessary to identify the goals of a national policy
regarding the banking and securities industries. We believe an
appropriate list of major policy objectives would include the fol-
lowing- (a) to promote maximum efficiency in the capital mar-
kets;4 8 (b) to create an environment in which financial
institutions have both the incentive and flexibility to meet the
47. See Competition and Conditions in the Financial System: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
243-44 (1981) (statement of Gordon T. Wallis, Pres., N.Y. Clearing House Ass'n).
48. The Report of the Joint Conference Committee on the Securities Acts
Amendments stated.
The securities markets of the United States are indispensable to the
growth and health of this country's and the world's economy. In order to
raise the enormous sums of investment capital that will be needed in the
years ahead and to assure that that capital is property allocated among
competing uses, these markets must continue to operate fairly and effi-
ciently. The increasing tempo and magnitude of the changes that are oc-
curing in our domestic and international economy make it clear that the
securities markets are due to be tested as never before. Unless these mar-
kets adapt and respond to the demands placed upon them, there is a dan-
ger that America will lose ground as an international financial center and
that the economic, financial and commercial interests of the Nation will
suffer.
rapidly changing demands of our economy;49 (c) to create a cli-
mate in which public trust in intermediating institutions is high;50
(d) to encourage widespread direct public ownership of American
industry;5 l (e) to promote fair competition not only within mar-
kets but between markets for substitute products;52 (f) to limit
the concentration of economic and political power of any one sec-
tor;53 and (g) to protect investors and depositors against improper
practices which might jeopardize their investments and savings.54
These goals frequently may be in conflict; nevertheless, a work-
able reconciliation among them should be attainable. For exam-
ple, a reasonable balance between promoting economic efficiency
and limiting concentration can be struck by limiting the areas of
direct competition between different types of institutions (i.e.,
commercial banks and investment banking firms) while encourag-
ing these institutions to offer close substitutes for each other's
products and providing for ease of entry by new competitors into
each of the markets.
The remaining subsections discuss the desirability of separat-
ing the banking and securities industries to maximize attainment
of the above policy objectives. For the reasons set forth, we be-
lieve that further erosion of the Glass-Steagall Act's basic tenets,
by legislation or otherwise, will seriously frustrate a balanced re-
alization of the above goals.
Economic Advantages Given to Banks by Government
Financial intermediation by banks involves the accumulation of
savings as deposits and the lending of those funds to those with
H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 321, 322.
49. Business Week estimates that during the decade 1975-84, $4.5 trillion in cap-
ital investment will be needed by the economy, nearly three times the $1.6 trillion
consumed in the 1965-74 decade. The Capital Crisis, Bus. WK., Sept. 22, 1975, at 42.
50. See J. Lorie, Public Policy for American Capital Markets 4-5 (Feb. 7, 1974)
(prepared for submission to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury).
51. See id.
52. See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 46-47 (1980) (Florida stat-
ute prohibiting out-of-state banks from owning business within state providing in-
vestment advisory services held violative of commerce clause).
53. See id.
54. The preamble to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states in part:
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as
commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter
markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it neces-
sary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of prac-
tices and matters related thereto,... to insure the maintenance of fair
and honest markets in such transactions.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 2, 48 Stat. 881, 881-82 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
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capital needs. This transfer process is a primary economic func-
tion of financial intermediaries. There are essentially two cost el-
ements in the intermediation of funds: (1) the rate of return
required to induce holders of excess funds to deposit them; and
(2) the costs of the intermediation process. The privileges that
banks enjoy, at the expense of both taxpayers and depositors, are
intended to lower those costs so that those who need funds may
obtain them relatively inexpensively.
For example, federal deposit insurance serves to lower the rates
of return required to attract depositors by making bank deposits
up to prescribed levels virtually "risk free." Such rates of return
also have been kept artificially low through governmental action
setting interest ceilings on deposits at levels below the rate that
market forces would otherwise dictate, or in some cases prohibit-
ing interest on certain types of deposits. Another significant ex-
ample is the so-called "All Savers" program recently authorized
by the Economic Recovery Tax Act,55 under which commercial
banks and other depository institutions are issued risk-free certif-
icates bearing interest at a rate equal to 70 percent of the one-
year Treasury bill rate, such interest being tax-free to individuals
up to substantial levels ($2,000 for individuals filing a joint re-
turn). Moreover, the direct costs of intermediation are reduced
through the favorable tax treatment accorded banks for interest
expenses 56 and loss reserves,5 7 which increases their after-tax
55. Economic Recovery Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 302(a), (d) (1), 95 Stat.
267, 270-71, 274 (1981) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 128).
56. Banks are permitted to deduct interest expenses incurred to hold tax-ex-
empt municipal bonds. Rev. Rul. 61-222, 1961-2 C.B. 58. This issue has become par-
ticularly relevant in connection with the quarter-century-old demand by money
center banks to underwrite municipal revenue bonds. Addressing the Subcommit-
tee on Select Revenue Measures of the House Ways and Means Committee in
April, 1981, on the ability of banks, unlike other taxpayers, to deduct the cost of
interest to maintain a position in tax exempt securities, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury John Chapoton said:
The treatment of banks under section 265(2) [of the Internal Revenue
Code] creates other serious problems. For example, banks, which in most
situations are not subject to section 265(2), compete in underwriting activ-
ities with broker-dealers, which, as a group, do not enjoy this exception.
We believe that this matter should be reconsidered in the context of the
current discussion of whether banks should be permitted to underwrite
municipal revenue bonds.
Revenue Procedure 80-55: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Meas-
ures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 7 (1981)
(statement of John Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury).
57. Although this provision is being gradually phased out, banks are permitted
income.
In addition, banks have ready access to short-term capital at
low cost through access to the federal funds market and the Fed's
discount window. The cost to banks of long-term capital is also
lower because of reduced risks associated with investment in the
banking business. Such reductions in risk result in part from the
readiness of the Fed to provide low cost credit through the dis-
count window to meet banks' temporary liquidity problems.
Economists would classify these special advantages and privi-
leges-deposit insurance,, access to the discount window and the
federal funds markets, interest rate ceilings and tax breaks-as
"subsidies," the purpose of which is to lower the cost of interme-
diation of funds and thus to lower the cost of funds to borrowers.
These subsidies are paid for directly or indirectly by the public.
The subsidies are provided to banks in the expectation they will
be passed on to borrowers of funds, thereby reducing borrowing
costs, making credit more freely vailable and stimulating eco-
nomic growth. It would constitute A clear departure from the pur-
pose of the subsidies for banks to employ them in securities or
other non-banking activities. In effect, it would represent a diver-
sion of a public subsidy from its intended purpose, and would ac-
cord banks, which already enjoy a position of concentrated power,
an unwarranted advantage that would frustrate competition and
innovation in the securities business.
Other Competitive Advantages of Banks
Increasing bank involvement in securities activities is likely to
produce several other anti-competitive effects, making it ex-
tremely difficult for others to compete on equal terms. These in-
clude regulatory inequality and heightened potential for tie-ins.
Section 3(a) (4) of the Securities Exchange Act defines the term
"broker" to mean "any person engaged in the business of effect-
ing transactions in securities for the account of others, but does
not include a bank."58 This statutory exclusion was based on the
congressional understanding that banks were prohibited from en-
gaging in the business of dealing in securities under the Glass-
Steagall Act. Those who are classified as "brokers" under the Se-
curities Exchange Act are required to conform to a comprehen-
sive system of governmental and self-imposed regulation
developed over the years for the protection of investors. Among
to reserve against future loan losses and to deduct such reserve from gross in-
come. LR.C. § 585 (1976).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(3) (a) (4) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
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the standards and safeguards provided under this system, but in-
applicable to banks and thus unavailable to their brokerage cus-
tomers, are those relating to advertising, broker training,
suitability, prompt and best execution, prompt delivery of securi-
ties and confirmations with regard to each transaction, disclosure
of adverse information, and insurance under the Securities Inves-
tor Protection Act. Despite the recommendations of a special re-
port to Congress on the bank "broker-dealer" exemption
completed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1977,59 the bank regulators have taken only the most tenuous
steps to provide meaningful protection for bank securities cus-
tomers.60 Thus, banks enjoy a substantial regulatory advantage
over securities firms inasmuch as they are not subject to the strict
regulation to which securities firms are subject,6 1 which adds to
the operating costs of these firms, while affording less protection
to those who invest in securities through banks. If Glass-Stea-
gall's restrictions are to be attenuated significantly, regulation of
59. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., IST
SESS., REPORTS ON BANKs SECURITIES AcTrvITrS OF THE SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE Comm. 289 (Comm. Print 1977) (final report of the Securities Exchange
Commission on bank securities activities).
60. The bank regulatory agencies have not even attempted to address certain
key recommendations of the SEC. For example, bank securities personnel still
are subject to no testing or licensing requirements or to any regulations governing
their substantive knowledge of the securities business or its legal requirements.
Moreover, the limited steps that have been taken by bank regulatory agencies do
not come close to approximating the system of broker-dealer regulation designed
for the protection of investors. In 1979, in response to the SEC's recommenda-
tions, the banking agencies adopted regulations governing recordkeeping and con-
firmation requirements and requiring banks to establish written policies and
procedures providing for, among other things, the assignment of responsibility for
supervision of securities personnel. 12 C.F.R. § 12 (1982) (Comptroller); 12 C.F.R.
§ 208 (1982) (Federal Reserve Board); 12 C.F.R. § 344 (1982) (FDIC). There are a
number of discrepancies between these rules and the rules of the SEC, however.
For example, the SEC's confirmation rule requires that broker-dealers generally
must send customers a written confirmation of a securities transaction within five
days of the transaction. Exchange Act Rule 10b-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1982).
The rules of the bank agencies provide several exceptions to this requirement that
are not present in the SEC's rules, such as permission for quarterly confirmations
where the bank exercises investment discretion over an account in an agency ca-
pacity. In addition, unlike the regulations applicable to broker-dealers, no particu-
lar procedures are specified to ensure adequate supervision of employees effecting
securities transactions for customers. In sum, the rules of the banking authorities
tend to be considerably more general than those of the SEC, in many cases rely-
ing on reference to "sound banking practices" rather than the more specific regu-
lations applicable to securities finns.
61. See SIA Discussion Paper, supra note 1, table 2, at 781-82.
bank securities activities would be best performed by a single
regulator: the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Another important competitive advantage wielded by banks
when they market securities services derives from the ability of
commercial banks to extend credit, the availability of which can
be "tied" to use of the bank's securities services. These tie-ins
may be explicit or implicit,62 but in either case they involve the
linkage of bank credit facilities with securities services.
A bank may condition the availability of its credit facilities on
an issuer's patronage of the bank's private placement or commer-
cial paper services. For example, most commercial paper is
backed by a bank line of credit. This gives banks the opportunity
to tie the availability of a credit line to use of the bank as distribu-
tor of commercial paper for the issuer.
Similar potential for a tie-in arises when a bank extends a letter
of credit to support a certain type of tax exempt housing revenue
bond issue underwritten by a syndicate co-managed by a bank.
These instruments, known as "option bonds" or "put bonds," give
the holders the right to have their bonds redeemed at par on cer-
tain dates up to thirty years in the future regardless of the cur-
rent market value. The letter of credit is provided, at a very
substantial fee, to fund payments to bondholders exercising their
redemption option. The large money center banks have the
unique ability to condition the granting of the letter of credit on
being awarded managing underwriter status and reportedly have
done so frequently.63
In light of these key advantages, together with the exclusive
privileges banks enjoy as intermediaries, creation of a "level play-
ing field" would require far more than simple repeal of Glass-
Steagall limitations.64
62. The opportunity for implicit tie-ins, which can be the most insidious, was
discussed and illustrated by Richard W. McLaren, then Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in charge of the Antitrust Division, in testimony before the Senate Banking
and Currency Committee when it was considering the 1970 one bank holding com-
pany legislation. See SIA Discussion Paper, supra note 1, at 783 n.94.
63. Examples of this practice are discussed in Carrington, Wall Street Officials
Tell Senate Panel Securities Bill Gives Banks Unfair Edge, Wall St. J., Feb. 11,
1982, at 6, col. 1.
64. In announcing the Administration's "separate subsidiary" proposal, Treas-
ury Secretary Regan recognized the inequalities and other problems inherent in
the approach taken in S.1720 (and other pending proposals) which would author-
ize banks directly to enlarge their securities activities and sharply distinguished
the Administration's approach:
Our proposed bank holding company securities subsidiary would have
the same tax treatment as an independent securities firm, the same regu-
lators and the same access to outside financing and outside customers. In
contrast, leaving securities activities submerged within the corporate
structure of a commercial bank as S.1720 presently does would afford the
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Preserving the Stability of the Banking System
There are three primary requisites to a stable banking system
that are becoming increasingly threatened as banks are permitted
to become extensively involved in securities activities: (1) the
making of prudent and disinterested loans and investments;
(2) the maintenance of a relatively stable flow of revenue; and
(3) the continued confidence of depositors and the public
generally.65
Disinterested lending is the bedrock of commercial banking. It
is a critical function of banks to make loan and investment deci-
sions solely on the basis of the financial prudence of each transac-
tion. The conflicts of interest that arise when banks also engage
in securities-related ventures severely undermine a bank's ability
to continue making disinterested banking decisions.66 As an ex-
ample, at the height of activity of the REIT67 industry, it was a
common bank practice to extend loans to a REIT to which the
bank or its affiliate was providing investment advisory services
and sponsorship. Although the amount of such loans has de-
clined significantly with the general decline in REITs, they illus-
trate the dangerous temptations to which banks may succumb in
promoting securities services. 68
bank several advantages in the securities business. The bank's securities
activities would have preferential tax treatment, particularly as regards
the carrying of securities in inventory; they would be regulated by the
Federal bank regulatory agencies for which securities activities are only a
limited aspect of bank business; they would have access to financing
based on the cost of the bank's insured deposits; and they would have op-
portunities for the non-arm's length linkage of traditional bank services to
the securities business of the bank. There are too many inequalities here
to satisfy the goal of equal treatment for all financial institutions doing the
same kinds of business.
Financial Institutions Restructing and Services Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1638, S.
1703, S. 1720 and S. 1721 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1981) (statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of
the Treasury).
65. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
66. This was a specific focus of the Supreme Court in its review of congres-
sional concern in this field. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630-34
(1981).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
68. After a lengthy review of the legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act
and the possibility of serious problems that could result from the involvement of
banks in the securities field, the Supreme Court in ICI v. Camp stated:
In sum, Congress acted to keep commercial banks out of the investment
banking business largely because it believed that the promotional incen-
tives of investment banking and the investment bankers' pecuniary stake
Similarly, should an issuer for whom a bank has effected a pri-
vate placement find itself in unexpected financial difficulty, the
bank may feel obliged to extend a loan which might not otherwise
conform to its normal credit standards. It understandably would
seek to avoid possible embarrassment and damage to its reputa-
tion among the institutions which had purchased the private
placement or the possibility of threatened litigation by the pur-
chasers under the securities laws.
Also, if a bank selling commercial paper is unable to place the
paper successfully, it must buy or keep the remainder for its own
account. This could result in a significant allocation of the bank's
assets to issuers whose credit is the most difficult to place, i.e.,
those whose paper is least acceptable to buyers of commercial
paper.
The second key element of bank stability is a steady source of
revenue. The commissions and underwriting revenues earned by
securities brokers are inherently cyclical.69 In addition, although
banks are now permitted to underwrite general obligation bonds
because relatively few risks were involved, even this area of the
securities industry entails significant risks for banks: shortly
before its demise, the Franklin National Bank lost $5.6 million in
the value of securities carried in the bank's security trading ac-
count or bond dealer operations.7 0 Even greater risks exist in the
case of commercial paper since it is not backed by the taxing
power of a governmental entity.
Moreover, because banks and brokers appear to be similarly af-
fected by the business cycle, greater participation in the securi-
ties business would tend to accentuate fluctuations in a bank's
income from its banking business. These fluctuations in bank
earnings erode public confidence (as is now occurring with thrift
institutions), which in turn undermines the financial system.
A third element of bank stability is depositor confidence. Any
serious loss of public confidence quite conceivably could lead to
major withdrawals of corporate and personal bank deposits, the
consequent diminution of the funds available for credit, and the
possibility of bank failures. Depositor confidence may be affected
adversely if banks become active in promoting a variety of invest-
ment vehicles that traditionally have been the province of securi-
in the success of particular investment opportunities was destructive of
prudent and disinterested commercial banking and of public confidence in
the commercial banking system.
401 U.S. at 634.
69. See SIA Discussion Paper, supra note 1, at 751, 790-91.
70. Foldessy, Franklin New York Puts Deficit at $60 Million in First Five
Months, Wall St. J., June 21, 1974, at 3, coL 1.
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ties firms. For example, if banks promote closed-end mutual
funds, REITs or commercial paper issues which fail to meet in-
vestor expectations-a not unlikely possibility since such invest-
ments certainly are not risk-free-the image of banks as riskless,
deposit-accepting institutions may be irreparably tarnished in the
minds of the public.7 '
Depositor confidence may also be shaken if the public percep-
tion of banks as a source of disinterested financial advice is de-
stroyed. The conflicts of interest that arise when a bank performs
various securities activities create the temptation for the bank to
act in a less than disinterested manner toward its depositors and
other customers.7 2 For example, although most trust departments
undoubtedly strive to conduct their businesses in full compliance
with the high standards imposed by fiduciary law, serious con-
flicts can lead to unconsciously distorted judgments. Even where
a "Chinese wall" is in place, a bank's trust department might be
inclined to purchase for its accounts securities being distributed
by the bank which, other things being equal, it would not deem
the best investment for such accounts.
In addition, the confidential financial information a bank fre-
quently requests in connection with its commercial lending func-
tions may be disclosed to its affiliated investment advisor and
may influence the bank in providing investment banking advice to
other customers. Such a potential conflict is apparent in cases
where the financing for a cash tender offer is arranged by the
same bank that serves as lender to the target company. In such
cases major commercial banks acquire confidential nonpublic in-
formation concerning a particular corporation and are able to pass
this information to other corporations to assist them in planning a
tender offer. The banks receive substantial fixed and contingent
fees from the offeror and act as lead banker and finance the
tender offer, often disregarding the fiduciary duties they owe to
their longstanding credit customers. This practice has led the
SEC to request Congress to initiate legislation prohibiting such a
role for banks.73
71. Loss of public confidence in the stability of the banking system resulting
from its involvement in securities activities was a primary concern of Congress in
enacting the Glass-Steagall Act. See ICI v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630-34 (1981).
72. Id. These concerns, as well, motivated Congress in passing the Glass-Stea-
gall Act.
73. See SENATE CoMM. ON BANIONG, HoUsING, AND URBAN MFFAIRs, 96TH CONG.,
In the area of municipal bonds, commercial banks seem to have
put themselves in an extremely awkward position because of the
multitude of roles they perform concurrently for municipal issu-
ers. These roles include underwriter to the municipality, deposi-
tory of its funds, investor in its securities, trustee of its bond and
note issues, lender to the municipality and, lastly, its financial ad-
viser. The combination of all of these activities in one institution
creates a situation where the potential conflicts cannot be re-
solved, for when the bank must act in order to protect its deposi-
tors, it may not be acting in the best interest of its municipal
client.
Other examples of potential conflicts of interest are easy to
cite.74 The point is that when members of the public perceive
these conflicts they may begin to wonder about the character of
the banking entity to which they entrust their funds.
Preventing Bank Domination of Financial Services
If the movement of major commercial banks into the securities
business goes unchecked, it is likely that they will come to domi-
nate several aspects of the industry. The sheer size of the money
center banks in relation to the securities industry suggests that
the latter would be unable to compete successfully against the
wealth of resources available to these banks. For example, bank
holding companies quickly became leading participants in the
personal finance and mortgage banking fields after being permit-
ted to engage in such activities. The magnitude of the major
banks in comparison to the securities industry is illustrated by
the fact that as of December 31, 1980, Citicorp and BankAmerica
Corporation, the two largest bank holding companies, had com-
bined equity capital of $7.8 billion, or 47 percent more than all
New York Stock Exchange member firms doing a public
business. 75
2D SESS., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CODMUSSION REPORT ON TENDER OFFER LAWS
8 (Comm. Print 1980).
74. A potential conflict may be said to exist where a bank does an exten-
sive business in investing money for clients as fiduciary, but at the same
time has other divisions that could benefit or suffer from the decisions of
the fiduciary arm. The disposition of brokerage commissions, for example,
might be used to attract broker deposits to banks. If the brokerage com-
missions could also be used to benefit the fiduciary accounts instead of
the bank, a potential conflict of interest would arise out of the structural
arrangements and relationships of the institution. Even if there were no
way in which the brokerage commissions could be used in the interest of
the fiduciary accounts, a potential conflict would exist, based on the value
of the brokerage to the institution and its cost to the trust accounts.
E. HER AN, supra note 28, at 7.
75. CrrIcoRP, CITICORP ANNUAL REPORT AND FORM 10K 1980 35 (1981); BANK-
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The securities industry's inability to compete against the eco-
nomic advantages and sheer size of the money center banks
would result in decreased competition in financial services, with
consequent reduction in the efficiency and responsiveness of the
capital markets in meeting financing demands. The commercial
banker offers a variety of commercial loan packages, funded by
one or more banks, while the investment banker offers a variety
of securities packages, funded by investors through public or pri-
vate offerings. The diversity of loans and securities packages of-
fered is, in large part, due to the competition between the two
industries. If commercial banks are allowed to offer both prod-
ucts, and come to dominate both financing alternatives, develop-
ment of innovative financing vehicles will be stifled. Further, a
few money center banks in effect will control access to the capital
markets by American industry, a situation not unlike that which
now prevails in many European countries. This not only would
disadvantage the customer seeking to raise capital in the most ef-
ficient and least costly manner, but would also distort the econ-
omy's delicate capital allocation process. Even if additional
competition in the securities industry were desirable, in view of
the above considerations it should not be provided by banks.
In fact, however, the brokerage industry is already highly
competitive.7 6-
The structural characteristics of a competitive industry com-
monly accepted by economists include: (1) low seller concentra-
tion; (2) lack of significant barriers to entry; and (3) low product
differentiation. The brokerage industry scores high on all three
counts.
First, the brokerage industry's membership is diffuse and rela-
tively non-concentrated. Second, there do not appear to be sub-
stantial barriers to entry. Generally, such barriers include the
absolute cost advantages discussed above, significant economies
of scale, and high product differentiation. Although banks enjoy
absolute cost advantages over members of the securities industry,
there are no apparent cost advantages enjoyed by members of the
securities industry over potential entrants. Furthermore, empiri-
cal studies suggest that there are no significant economies of
AmEmRICA CORPORATION, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 33 (1981); NEW YORK STOCK EX-
CHANGE, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 1981 54 (1981).
76. See Schaefer & Smith, Economies of Scale: An Unsettled Issue, 5 SEC. IN-
DUSTRY TRENDS 10 (1979).
scale in the securities industry77 Finally, there is relatively little
product differentiation in the securities industry. What little
product differentiation existed in the industry as a result of the
service competition in which brokers engaged during the period
of fixed commission rates78 has waned as price competition has
resulted from the May 1, 1975 unfixing of commissions. Moreover,
the sharp decline in commission charges of many firms since that
date attests to the intensity of competition in the brokerage
business.7 9
Indeed, the employment by major commercial banks of their
unique advantages in the securities industry is likely to produce
non-productive, and even detrimental, competition in that indus-
try. The risk of increased economic concentration and the possi-
bility of significant damage to the capital-raising mechanism
argue strongly for maintaining the lines established by the Glass-
Steagall Act.
It is impossible to predict with certainty what will occur if
banks are permitted to expand their securities activities. Never-
theless, the risks of undue concentration of resources, unfair com-
petition, inadequate investor protection, and possible damage to
confidence in the banking system cannot be taken lightly. Mea-
sured against the principal policy objectives set forth above, it
seems clear that the economy has little to gain and much to lose
from such a gamble.
THE NECESSARY PERSPECTIVE FOR CONSIDERING RELAXATION OF
THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
It should be apparent that proposals to change the Glass-Stea-
gall Act cannot be assessed adequately in a vacuum but require
evaluation from a number of perspectives. The importance of as-
suring comprehensive congressional review and study was under-
scored in a document entitled "Financial Institutions in a
Revolutionary Era,"8 0 prepared in 1981 by the staff of the House
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs at the request
77. See id.
78. Mann, The New York Stock Exchange: A Cartel at the End of Its Reign, in
PROMOTiNG CoMPETrION IN REGULATED MARKETS 301, 310 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
79. See SEC, The Effect of the Absence of Fixed Rates of Commissions, SEcURI-
Tins AND EXCHANGE CoinssioN REPORT 3 (1975).
80. 127 CONG. REC. H8194 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1981). Similarly, the need for com-
prehensive review of the nation's financial regulatory structure was stressed by
SEC Chairman Shad, who proposed the creation of a non-partisan task force for
this purpose in recent Senate testimony. See Securities Activities of Depository
Institutions: Hearings on S. 1720 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1982)
(statement of John S. Shad).
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of the chairperson and ranking minority member of the commit-
tee. In this section, we identify a number of vantages from which
proposed changes in the Glass-Steagall Act should be assessed.
Structure of Our Financial System
To a large extent, our existing financial system derives its struc-
ture from the proscriptions of the Glass-Steagall Act. Significant
redefinition of the role of banks in the securities business will
have deep and lasting effects on our financial structure and on the
functioning of the capital markets. While these consequences
would merit the most careful attention in any event, such study is
particularly crucial in light of the central importance of the capi-
tal markets to the success of the economic recovery program.
As noted previously, money center banks are sufficiently well
capitalized to dominate any financial services business in which
they are permitted to engage. 81 Thus, it would be impossible to
redraw the Glass-Steagall line without potentially precipitating
major unpredictable changes in our financial structure. Naturally,
such changes could be expected to have a significant impact on
the efficiency and responsiveness of our capital markets. For ex-
ample, any change which would have an effect on the ability of
small regionally-based securities firms to survive should not be
taken lightly. As the SEC has found,82 such firms are a vital part
of the capital-raising process for newly emerging companies. Sim-
ilarly, as noted earlier, the widespread takeover of investment
banking firms by banks would diminish an independent source of
innovative financing methods.83 In short, any changes in the
Glass-Steagall Act should be recognized as having potential for a
significant restructuring of the investment banking industry and
the capital markets it serves.
Regulation of Financial Institutions
Another critical element of our financial system is its regulatory
81. See supra text accompanying note 75.
82. See SBA & SEC, Initial Offerings of Common Stock. The Role of the Re-
gional Broker-Dealers in the Capital Formation Process, SMALL BusINEss ADmmiS-
TRATION AND SEC PHASE I REPORT 2 (1980); SBA & SEC, The Role of Regional
Broker-Dealers in the Capital Formation Process: Underwriting, Market-Making
and Securities Research Activities, SMALL Busnmss ADMINISTRATION AND SEC
PHASE II REPORT 2 (1981).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
structure. Despite the general trend toward deregulation of
American industry, financial institutions-because of their vital
role in the economy-probably always will and should be regu-
lated to some extent. As long as financial institutions are permit-
ted to maintain custody of the savings and investment of the
general populace (e.g., banks, pension funds and insurance com-
panies), government will insist on scrutinizing their use of these
funds, their liquidity, and other aspects of their operations. Per-
haps equally important is the dependence on these institutions
by American industry for capital. Thus, the financial industry is
unlikely ever to be deregulated in these respects.
Any proposed changes in the Glass-Steagall Act's prohibitions
which might restructure the financial system should therefore be
considered from a regulatory viewpoint as well. In particular, the
congressional goal should be to ensure that all institutions per-
mitted to perform the same function are not only subject to the
same scheme of regulation but are also under the aegis of the
same regulator. A regulatory structure which permits multiple
regulatory patterns or multiple regulators for different institu-
tions engaged in the same activity invites "charter shopping" and
"competition in laxity," as bank regulators vie to expand their turf
by offering the regulated entities fewer and less onerous burdens.
As noted above, the disparity of regulation between securities
firms and other types of financial institutions which seek to per-
form securities functions has been historically significant. Con-
gress clearly cannot let such a situation exist if Glass-Steagall is
to be amended. For example, if banks were no longer to be sub-
ject to Glass-Steagall restrictions, their exemption from broker-
dealer registration under the Securities Exchange Act would no
longer be supportable.
Taxation of Financial Institutions
A similar point should be noted with respect to the application
of our federal income tax laws to financial institutions. Under the
present structure, various tax advantages described have been af-
forded to commercial banks to encourage them to provide funds
in a particular way. Thus, as noted above, banks-but not bro-
kers-are permitted to deduct interest costs for carrying tax-free
portfolios and the reserves for loan losses. Although these and
other tax advantages may be appropriate under the existing
structure, they clearly must be reexamined if the separation im-
posed by Glass-Steagall is to be altered.
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Competitive Balance Between the Securities
and Banking Businesses
It is not only the Glass-Steagall Act which separates commer-
cial and investment banking. The Bank Holding Company Act
also serves to separate these businesses through its general provi-
sions restricting the non-banking activities of bank holding com-
panies. Any proposed revisions to the Glass-Steagall Act
therefore must be viewed in the broader context of Congress' de-
termination to separate commercial banking from unrelated com-
mercial activities. It would be unfair to permit banks to expand
their activities into the securities area through relaxation of
Glass-Steagall's proscriptions without providing equal opportu-
nity for the securities industry to expand its commercial banking
activities. 84 Such expansion could not be achieved equitably,
however, if the Bank Holding Company Act were left intact and
securities firms were required to divest their non-banking activi-
ties as a prerequisite to expanding their banking-related services.
Any changes ip the Glass-Steagall Act would therefore necessi-
tate reexamination of the Bank Holding Company Act and the en-
tire issue of the separation of banking and non-banking activities.
CONCLUSION
In light of the important changes that have occurred in the na-
tion's financial services industry over the past half-century, con-
gressional reexamination of the Glass-Steagall Act is certainly
appropriate, and should proceed in the context of a comprehen-
sive review of the laws and regulations bearing upon the struc-
ture of our financial institutions. For the reasons advanced earlier
in this article, the SIA believes that the Glass-Steagall Act and its
underlying policy have not lost their validity and, indeed, have
contributed importantly to the current overall soundness of the
nation's financial system. In the event that Congress, after com-
84. The need for such parity of treatment for securities firms is recognized in
the Administration's proposal. Thus, in his testimony announcing the proposal,
Secretary Regan noted "[W]ith regard to competitive equality, a securities firm
dealing only in federal, municipal, or mutual fund obligations could establish a
holding company and own a commercial bank within it." See Financial Institu-
tions Restructing and Services Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1638, S. 1703, S. 1720 and
S. 1721 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1981) (statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the
Treasury).
pleting a comprehensive review, should conclude that some
change is appropriate, the SIA believes that the "separate subsid-
iary" approach appears to represent the most sensible conceptual
starting point for redefinition of the role of banks in the securities
field. Should Congress follow this course, it must simultaneously
assure that viable safeguards are established against the hazards
addressed above and that the securities industry is afforded com-
parable opportunity to engage in commercial banking activities.
